CLASSLESS AND UNCIVIL:
THE THREE-DECADE LEGACY OF EVANS V. JEFF D.
William H. Fedullo
INTRODUCTION
Blood was spilled to bring civil rights laws to the United States. While
the drafters of those laws might have worked from the relative safety of
congressional offices, the people who created the political conditions
necessary for that act of drafting to be possible put their bodies on the line
for their conception of a more just and equal society. From abolitionists
taking up arms in Bleeding Kansas, to Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee activists risking brutal beatings to organize the march on Selma,
to disability rights activists crawling up Capitol Hill to shame lawmakers into
passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, great civil rights advances in our
society have often been brought about by awesome acts of raw physical
courage on the part of otherwise ordinary people.1
It can be difficult to relate the heroism that brought us these laws to the
fine points of their routine operation. While standing in the shadow of that
heroism, to worry about how private attorneys and litigants finance civil right
lawsuits can seem entirely beside the point—or worse yet, mercenary. But
that shadow should not blind. Civil rights fee-shifting, in which a losing civil
rights defendant is made to pay the attorney’s fee for a civil rights plaintiff,
has played a key role in making effective private enforcement of our civil
rights laws economically feasible. To understand how the physical courage
of civil rights activists has—and has not—translated into material changes in
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the lives of aggrieved, marginalized people, one must look into the economics
of private civil rights enforcement.
For as long as the United States has contemplated civil rights laws, there
have been controversies over whether and how those laws should be privately
enforced. During congressional debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
Representative James Beck (D-KY), as part of an impassioned, voluminous,
and unabashedly racist denunciation of the bill, warned of the federal
tyranny that would result if private parties were permitted to bring civil rights
actions: to allow federal courts jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought
by private parties would be, Beck claimed, a “supreme folly” that would
bring “local state government [to] an end” by making their “laws . . . a
mockery and their courts a farce.”2 Latter-day critics of the civil rights
enforcement regime tend to be less bombastic than Representative Beck, but
questions about the propriety, efficacy, and social utility of the private right
of action have persisted. While in the 1960s, anti-regulation Republicans
embraced private civil rights enforcement as a preferable alternative to the
creation of a centralized civil rights bureaucracy, by the 1980s, conservative
sentiments had shifted.3 The Reagan Administration complained that
litigation authorized by the same statute Beck had criticized more than a
century prior had “mushroomed” and “ballooned,” inconveniencing
government and private business to an extent that necessitated the
curtailment of the traditional prevailing party fee-shift, which had been
extended to all civil rights cases through the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act.4 Reagan’s concerns have been occasionally echoed by
more liberal voices: in 2016, Anderson Cooper reported on a supposed
epidemic of frivolous, “drive-by” lawsuits arising under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.5 Private civil rights enforcement, in both substance and
procedure, remains a live-fire ideological battlefield.
This Comment will explore a corner of that battlefield: the Supreme
Court’s decision in Evans v. Jeff D.6 Two things were at stake in Jeff D.: the
ability of private civil rights attorneys to protect their statutorily authorized
fees and, consequently, the efficacy of the private enforcement regime as a
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whole. In the case, Charles Johnson, a legal aid attorney, brought a civil
rights class action suit against the Governor of Idaho and other state officials
on behalf of institutionalized disabled children who had been denied access
to adequate education or healthcare.7 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief and statutorily authorized attorney’s fees, but made no
demand for money damages.8 The defense made a settlement offer that
would have substantially granted the injunctive relief sought, but which was
conditioned on the plaintiff accepting a waiver of statutory attorney’s fees.9
Johnson, who had been appointed next friend for his clients, believed he had
an ethical duty to accept the settlement, but filed a motion requesting that
the district court refuse to approve the fee waiver.10 The district court denied
Johnson’s request; on appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the fee
waiver while leaving the rest of the settlement in place.11 Unfortunately for
Johnson, the Supreme Court granted the Idaho defendants certiorari.
Johnson’s predicament was hardly unique. In the 1980s, statutory fee
waiver offers were extremely common in the field of civil rights law.12 These
offers put the attorneys who received them in a bind. The attorneys, of
course, could not ethically prevent their clients from accepting the settlement
offers, no matter how unfavorable they might be to the attorneys’ interests.13
But if the client did so, not only the attorney, but the civils rights bar in
general, would be left in the lurch: the attorney would receive no payment
for her services, and other attorneys, in fear of suffering the same fate, might
be dissuaded from taking on civil rights cases in the future—especially those
cases unlikely to produce substantial damage awards.14 If those attorneys
turned away from civil rights litigation, the vitality of the civil rights private
enforcement regime would be threatened.
The Court did not find fears of the collapse of private civil rights
enforcement persuasive. Arguing instead that prohibiting fee waiver would
actually hinder civil rights enforcements by “reducing the attractiveness of
settlement,” the Court found that the practice did not undermine the policies
of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act.15 The fee waiver offer had
obtained legal legitimacy.
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Regardless of fee waiver’s legal legitimacy, the propriety and social utility
of fee waiver remains a live question. This Comment will examine the
history, effects, and normative value of the Jeff D. decision. Part I explores
the legal history that led to the Jeff D. ruling and examines the decision itself.
Part II examines the actual empirical effects of the ruling, using the
Integrated Database of the Federal Judicial Center to evaluate the case’s
impact on new privately-brought federal civil rights filings and consent
decrees, and concludes that the case brought about a collapse of the civil
rights class action bar. Part III examines ethical difficulties created by the
ruling and argues that there are substantial ethical and philosophical reasons
to reject the principle behind the ruling.
I. JEFF D. AND ITS HISTORY
Fee-shifting in private attorney general civil rights suits—in which a
private plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees at defendant’s expense in
consideration for her efforts to vindicate a civil and hence inherently public
right—has a venerable history in the United States. Congress first
authorized fee-shifting during the Reconstruction Era, in the Enforcement
Act of 1870, which created “such allowance for counsel fees as the court shall
deem just” for prevailing plaintiffs in voting rights cases.16 Early private
attorney general actions were more hypothetical than actual, however. The
exigencies of Reconstruction and its aftermath—in particular, widespread
racial terrorism against African Americans and the lack of sufficiently strong
political structures to support plaintiffs in bringing claims and enforcing
judgments—prevented the creation of a functional civil rights bar.17 Not
until the 1950s did Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes see a substantial
revival, when lawyers from the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People began regularly bringing actions under the Ku Klux Act,18
which authorizes fee-shifting for cases involving the violation of
constitutional rights under the color of law.19 Private civil rights lawsuits
continued to grow in volume throughout the 1960s and ‘70s, aided in large
part by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which favored private
litigation over administrative enforcement actions.20
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Though the Supreme Court eventually rejected the practice of judicial
(but not statutory) imposition of civil rights fee-shifting in Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company v. Wilderness Society,21 the private attorney general concept would
prove to be an enduring feature of the American legal system, and, in
particular, the civil rights enforcement regime. A year after Alyeska, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.22 Congress,
fearing that the Court’s decision in Aleyska had threatened the vitality of
private enforcement of the civil rights laws by rendering fee-shifting
“suddenly unavailable in the most fundamental civil rights cases,” explicitly
extended the availability of prevailing party fee-shifting to a wide variety of
civil rights actions.23 Congress believed that the Fees Act would “attract
competent counsel to represent the victims of civil rights violations” by
“creating economic incentives for lawyers to represent them.”24
Against the threat of a burgeoning civil rights bar, defendants adopted
innovative negotiation tactics to avoid large payouts and discourage the filing
of subsequent civil rights claims. One such tactic involved the exploitation
of the differences in interest between civil rights attorneys and their clients.
Specifically, civil rights defendants identified the statutory provision of
attorney’s fees as a key point of potential attorney-client tension. To exploit
this tension, defendants would make settlement offers that decoupled
attorney’s fees from the client’s relief on the merits. In some cases, civil rights
defendants would offer so-called “sweetheart” settlement offers—offers of
attorney’s fees substantially in excess of what the civil rights attorney could
reasonably expect to be awarded at trial, coupled with unreasonably limited
substantial relief to the plaintiff.25 In other cases, defendants would make
21
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Perhaps one might argue that the proliferation of sweetheart offers could cause general reputational
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settlement offers under which the plaintiff would substantially achieve their
ends, but which were contingent on the waiver of statutory attorney’s fees.26
This latter species of offer preyed on an attorney’s ethical duty to her client—
an attorney given such an offer would be obligated to present it to her client,
and could not ethically prevent her client from accepting it.27 Unfortunately
for civil rights attorneys, clients had little incentive not to accept the proposed
relief.28 The attorneys had a duty to advance the interests of their client in
substantive relief; the clients had no reciprocal duty to advance the interest
of their attorneys in being paid for their services.29
The benefits of making such fee waiver offers to civil rights defendants
were two-fold: first, if accepted, the defendant would avoid paying a
potentially substantial attorney’s fee to the other party; second, and perhaps
more importantly, especially for an institutional defendant likely to face
future civil rights litigation, the fee waiver offer disincentivized the bringing
of future claims.30 Attorneys, uncertain of the prospect of seeing any return
on their investment of time, energy, and money, even when successful in
winning relief for their clients, would be less likely to bring a case in the
future.31 This would be especially true in low-damages or injunctive-reliefonly cases, which were and are common in the civil rights context.32
Attorneys who nonetheless took civil rights cases in the hopes of receiving
their statutorily prescribed fee were assuming a risk significantly greater than
that of an attorney taking a tort claim on contingency—the contingency fee
attorney runs the risk of not getting paid if she loses her case; the civil rights
attorney ran the risk of not being paid even if she secured a favorable
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settlement for her client.33 This state of affairs was thought to pose an
existential threat to the civil rights plaintiffs’ bar, and in particular, small,
private civil rights practices.34
Throughout the 1980s, the fee-waiver offer increasingly became a de
rigueur feature of defensive civil rights lawyering. By 1985, approximately half
of all civil rights cases involved such an offer at some stage of litigation.35
While some state and local bar associations responded by declaring such
offers to be ethical violations on the part of defense counsel, such prohibitions
did little to soften the growth of fee waiver offers in practice.36
It was against this background that Charles Johnson, a twenty-five year
old, newly-barred attorney working for the Idaho Legal Aid Society,
encountered a grave injustice in a state mental health facility.37 Mentally
disabled children were being warehoused in state institutions, without
receiving proper mental treatment or education.38 Johnson reacted with
horror to the reality he observed in State Hospital South: “I saw children as
young as 11 years old institutionalized with adult mental patients, including
some child molesters . . . . Maybe I had lived a sheltered life, but I thought
the conditions I found there didn’t exist anywhere except in a Charles
Dickens novel.”39
In 1980, Johnson, still working for Idaho Legal Aid, brought a Section
1983 class action against Idaho’s governor, alleging that the institutionalized
children had suffered a deprivation of their constitutional rights.40 Johnson
sought injunctive and declaratory relief for the class—specifically, that the
institutionalized children be separated from the adult population, and that
they receive adequate education and therapy—but advanced no claim for
money damages.41 Johnson’s class action represented a paradigmatic
example of the cases most vulnerable to fee waiver offers: a case of indigent
clients with no independent means to pay attorney’s fees advancing a claim
for injunctive and declaratory relief only. Unsurprisingly, it fell victim to the
practice. A week before trial, the defense offered settlement terms that would
grant “virtually all” of the injunctive relief sought, in exchange for a waiver
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of all claims to fees and costs.42 While Idaho Legal Aid opposed acceptance,
Johnson, who had been appointed next friend of his clients and thus had sole
authority to accept or reject settlements, felt ethically obligated to acquiesce
to the substantively favorable offer.43 However, alleging that defense counsel
had exploited his ethical duty to his clients, Johnson motioned the district
court to use its power to review class action settlements44 to set aside the fee
waiver and to give him leave to submit a bill of fees.45 While the district court
rejected the ethics-based argument, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit sided with
Johnson, striking down the settlement’s fee waiver while upholding its
substantive terms and remanding the case with instructions to the district
court to award reasonable attorney’s fees.46 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
fee waiver was contrary to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act; in
order to comply with the act’s policies, settlement negotiations in civil rights
class actions would have to be bifurcated into negotiations on the merits, and
negotiations for fees.47 The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court, in an 6-3 opinion written by Justice Stevens, rejected the
Court of Appeals’ reasoning. First, it rejected the notion that the district
court had the power to modify the settlement in the way Johnson had
requested—while the district court could accept or reject the settlement’s
terms, it had no power to accept the relief offered on the merits while
requiring the defendant to, against its wishes, pay attorney’s fees.48 It further
reasoned that because Congress had, through the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act, intended for fees to go the prevailing party in litigation, the
plaintiff, not the attorney, could dispose of the fees as she deemed fit.49
Further, to allow fee waiver would not otherwise contravene the policies of
the Fees Act—fee waiver would actually, the Court argued, promote the
effective vindication of civil rights claims by making defendants more likely
to settle or enter into consent decrees.50
While the Court did not categorically forbid district courts from rejecting
settlement terms based on their inclusion of fee waiver,51 it did confirm the
42
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legitimacy of the fee waiver offer as a tool of defensive civil rights lawyering.
For better or for worse, the practice of civil rights law had changed.
II. THE IMPACT OF JEFF D.
Justice Stevens’ decision did not escape criticism. While Justice Brennan
remained optimistic that private attorney general suits would survive, he
could not help but denounce the ruling as an attack on effective civil rights
enforcement, writing in dissent, “[I]t does not require a sociological study to
see that permitting fee waivers will make it more difficult for civil rights
plaintiffs to obtain legal assistance. It requires only common sense.”52
Others spoke in more apocalyptic tones, with one scholar claiming, “Short
of a swift reaction by Congress, the potential for a plaintiff to ever recover his
attorney’s fees in future civil rights litigation is speculative.”53 Other writers,
sharing Brennan’s fear that the rule of Jeff D., left unchecked, would have a
deleterious impact on civil rights litigation, proposed a variety of mechanisms
they believed could significantly soften its negative impact.54 But even the
more optimistic of the contemporary commentators could not conceal a
growing consensus that the Supreme Court, wittingly or not, had created a
crisis that threatened the ability of private plaintiffs to effectively vindicate
their rights recognized under civil right statutes.
Controversy over Jeff D. was not limited to the pages of law journals.
Congress, in a general rebuke to the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
on civil rights issues,55 passed new civil rights legislation that, among other
things, amended the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act to include a
ban on fee waiver offers.56 Under the bill, settlements, consent decrees, and
52
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Id. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Debra Watts McCormick, The Effect of Evans v. Jeff D. on Civil Rights Litigation, 12 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 415, 429 (1987).
See, e.g., Margaret Annabel de Lisser, Comment, Giving Substance to the Bad Faith Exception of Evans v.
Jeff D., 136 U. PA. L. REV. 553, 554 (1987) (arguing that proper judicial policing of bad faith
settlement offers could prevent abuse of fee waiver offers); Goldstein, supra note 25, at 272
(proposing “properly limited joint control [of settlements] contracts” as a means to “promote the
policies of both the fee-shifting statutes and the ethical codes”); Woodlin, supra note 32, at 1215
(1987) (arguing that state and local ethics committees can and should bar defense attorneys from
making fee waiver offers).
This rebuke was probably not intended specifically for the decision in Jeff D. Congress found that
“in a series of recent decisions addressing employment discrimination claims under Federal law, the
Supreme Court cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights protections.”
Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 2 (emphasis added). Congress may have been
referring to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 (1989) (requiring more stringent proof
than mere statistical evidence of racial imbalance within a defendant’s workforce to make out a
disparate impact claim under Title VII) and other employment discrimination cases, e.g. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 9 (1990).
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stipulations of dismissal would be ineffective, “unless the parties or their
counsel attest to the court that a waiver of all or substantially all attorney’s
fees was not compelled as a condition of the settlement.”57 However, the
1990 Act did not become law, as the first President Bush vetoed the bill.58
While concerns about fee waiver were not the thrust of President Bush’s
objections—he primarily objected to provisions in the bill that he claimed
would incentivize businesses to adopt racial quotas to avoid disparate impact
discrimination liability—he did take time to criticize the fee waiver provisions
in his veto message.59 His reasoning echoed that of Justice Stevens in the
original Jeff D. decision; he argued that a ban on fee waiver would make more
settlement in civil rights cases more difficult, and would further be a boon
not to a deserving population of victims of civil rights violations, but to a
supposedly selfish plaintiff’s bar.60 With that veto, legislative fee waiver
reform died in Congress. While Congress would pass the Civil Rights Act of
1991, it excluded the fee waiver language, perhaps as a concession to
overcome the threat of a second veto.61 The effects of Jeff D. would not be
legislatively blunted. We are still living with those effects today.
Despite its deprecation at the hands of Justice Brennan, a little
sociological study can do a lot to clarify what sort of effect Jeff D. really had
on civil rights litigation—but it can also occlude that effect. More recent
scholarship tends to be somewhat equivocal about the question of what
empirically provable effect Jeff D. had. Professor Reingold, while adamant
that it is “common knowledge within the plaintiffs’ bar” that Jeff D. brought
about the “death of section 1983 [for plaintiffs with low-damage cases and
for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief],” acknowledges the difficulty of proving
this fact through statistical evidence.62 To understand the true effect of Jeff
D., one must examine the relevant statistics in a more fine-grained manner
than have previous commentators.

57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
S. DOC. NO. 101-35, at 11 (1990), https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/
Messages/BushGHW/S2104-Sdoc-101-35.pdf.
Id.
Id.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 38 (2008); see also
Nazer, supra note 25, at 500 (“[C]ommentators have claimed that Jeff D. will discourage attorneys
from accepting civil rights cases and will cause plaintiffs’ attorneys to regularly miss out on collecting
statutory attorney’s fees. Empirical research, however, suggests that Jeff D. did not have as dire an
effect as was anticipated”).
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A. Methodology and Data
To determine the effects of Jeff D., I examine the following categories of
data: (1) the annual number of new privately brought civil rights filings in
federal district courts, (2) the annual number of new privately brought civil
rights class action cases in federal district courts, and (3) the annual number
of new consent decrees entered into in privately brought civil rights class
action cases in federal district courts. “Privately brought” here is defined to
mean any action not initiated by the U.S. Government. This language can
prove slightly misleading, however, as any civil rights action brought by a
state government in a federal district court would be treated as private.
“Private” also does not distinguish between different kinds of plaintiff’s
attorneys—it does not tell us if an attorney was working in private practice,
or for the Legal Services Corporation, or for some other civil rights nonprofit.
To find the overall number of new privately brought federal civil rights
filings, I consulted the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.63 The Reports contain information on
the number of suits brought per year by type of action and by basis of
jurisdiction. To get an annual figure for privately-brought federal civil rights
filings, for each year between 1970 and 2017, I added together the number
of civil rights cases brought under U.S. defendant, federal question, and
diversity jurisdictions.64 The Annual Reports classify civil rights cases
brought by prisoners separately from all other civil rights cases; I chose to
honor this convention, in large part due to the high volume of pro se prisoner
petitions, the volume of which would be, presumably, unaffected by changes
in rules regarding attorney’s fees.65
To track the number of privately brought civil rights class actions, I used
the Integrated Database of the Federal Judicial Center, which allows one to
search civil filings from fiscal year 1970 to present.66 I refined my searches
to include civil rights cases with class action allegations filed on the basis of
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ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, Table C-2 (1970–2017).
From 1970–2000, very, very few civil rights cases were brought under diversity jurisdiction. See id.
For an examination of prisoner pro se actions, see Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se
Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13, 14 (1998).
IDB Civil 1970-1987, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/interactive/IDB-civil1970-1987 (last visited May 1, 2019) (providing data from fiscal year 1970–1987); IDB Civil 1988present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/interactive/IDB-civil-since-1988 (last
visited May 1, 2019) (providing data from fiscal year 1988 to present). Prior to 1976, fiscal years
began on July 1st of the calendar year before the fiscal year and end on June 30th of the calendar
year that matches the fiscal year. In order to promote consistency in the data set, July 1st and June
30th were used as the starting and ending points, respectively, of all fiscal years.
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U.S. defendant, federal question, and diversity jurisdictions per year. I again
excluded prisoner petitions.
I also used the Integrated Database to find the number of new civil rights
consent decrees. I refined my searches to include civil rights cases filed on
the basis of U.S. defendant, federal question, and diversity jurisdictions that
were disposed through consent decrees per year. Once again, I excluded
prisoner petitions.
I treat the critics and proponents of Jeff D. as making two distinct
hypotheses. The critic’s hypothesis is that, all other things being equal, the
permissibility of fee waiver offers would cause new civil rights federal filings
to fall by dissuading attorneys from taking on new civil rights cases. The
proponent’s hypothesis is that the permissibility of fee waiver offers would
not cause new federal filings to fall, but would rather lead to a rise in the
number of settlements.
This data admittedly has limitations that may obscure our analysis of the
effects of Jeff D. First, it will obviously not pick up civil rights filings in state
forums. While there is no obvious reason to suspect that Jeff D. would have
a different effect on federal claims in state forums than on federal claims in
federal forums, the lack of state filing data is still a limitation on our analysis.
On a related note, Jeff D. may have caused an uptick in the pursuit of state
law civil rights remedies, as states are free to interpret their own fee-shifting
statutes so as to forbid fee waiver.67
Second, the data set only begins to track pro se filings in FY 1988, which
constitute a substantial percentage of all new federal filings.68 Further, the
data available for pro se petitions in the years 1988 to 1995 is highly suspect,
as the number of pro se filings reported is implausibly low, both for privately
brought civil rights cases, and for all civil cases (in 1988, for example, the
data set reports only 47 pro se cases of any type). While data from the late
1990s onward shows that pro se filings constitute a significant fraction of all
privately brought civil rights claims, ranging from approximately a tenth in
1998 to nearly a third in 2010, the data does not give us a sufficient basis to
analyze the effect that Jeff D. had on pro se filings. One would predict that
pro se filing rates would presumably not be negatively affected by Jeff D.,
both because the threat of fee waiver is irrelevant to a party representing
herself. One might speculate that, if anything, Jeff D. would have actually
increased civil rights pro se filings, as particularly perseverant plaintiffs, unable
67

68

See, e.g., Flannery v. Prentice, 28 P.3d 860, 862 (Cal. 2001) (holding that attorney’s fees awarded
under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act belonged to the attorney); Woods v. Parker,
901 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that attorney’s fees awarded under Tennessee’s
anti-discrimination statute belonged to the attorney, not the plaintiff).
See Goldschmidt, supra note 65.
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to secure an attorney, go forward with bringing civil rights claims on their
own behalf.
Third, while major civil rights statutes uniformly have fee-shifting, either
through the Fees Act69 or through their own autonomous fee-shifting
provisions,70 the provision of statutory attorney’s fees may be less important
in certain categories of cases, namely those where substantial money
damages are sought. In such cases, attorneys and clients may enter into
contingency fee agreements that would largely immunize the attorney from
the harms associated with fee waiver offers.71 In particular, the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), which allows for damages claims, may
have spurred much of the growth in privately filed civil rights acts throughout
the 1990s, as its damages provision may have, at times, lead to substantial
verdicts and settlements.72 However, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed
with the data used here, as the dataset does not separately track ADA claims
prior to 2004. If the ADA was the driving force behind the increase in civil
rights in the first half of the 1990s, the apparent lenity with which judges
treated ADA defendants may have caused the later decline in new filings;
plaintiffs rarely prevailed in ADA cases brought to trial in the 1990s.73
Finally, the data on consent decrees clearly does not tell us the full story
of pre- and post-Jeff D. settlements. The Integrated Database does allow for
searches of cases that ended in settlement; however, it appears that this data
was not accurately coded before the mid-1980s. For fiscal year 1985, a
69

70

71

72

73

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012). The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act creates prevailing party feeshifting for actions arising under 34 U.S.C. § 12361 (concerning crimes of gender-based violence
committed under color of law), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (concerning the right to contract and participate
equally in the court system), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (concerning the right to acquire and dispose of
property), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (concerning the deprivation under color of law of rights, privileges, and
immunities guaranteed under the Constitution), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (concerning conspiracy to violate
civil rights and obstruction of justice), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (concerning complicity liability for parties
aware of conspiracy to violate civil rights or obstruct justice who, despite having power to do so,
neglect or refuse to stop the conspiracy), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (concerning official acts that
substantially burden the free exercise of religion), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (concerning land-use
regulations that impede religious exercise), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (concerning discrimination in
federally funded programs).
See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-38, § 216(b), 77 Stat. 56; Age Discrimination Act of
1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6401(e)(1) (1979); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2018).
Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 85 (1990) (holding that contingent fee contracts are valid in
Section 1988 cases, even if the contract would result in the attorney earning more than the statutory
attorney’s fee).
See, e.g., Jury Verdict Round-Up: Year-to-Date Top 10 Employment Verdicts, LEXIS (2016),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/jvsubmission/b/adjudication/archive/2016/09/09/jury-verdictround-up-year-to-date-top-10-employment-verdicts.aspx (recording several multi-million-dollar
ADA verdicts). Such verdicts are likely atypical.
Ruth Colker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV.
99, 108 (1999) (finding that ADA defendants prevailed at a rate of 94% at trial through either
dismissal, judgment, or verdict, and that defendants prevailed on appeal at a rate of 84%).
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search for all cases of any type terminating in settlement yields only 13 results.
It is not until 1988 that it shows a remotely plausible overall settlement
number of 32,520 (which, while plausible, is likely incorrect). As such, this
Comment cannot examine the effect of Jeff D. on overall settlement rates.
However, consent decree numbers can still be useful for this Comment’s
purposes, because consent decrees often arise in litigation in which injunctive
relief is sought. If more consent decrees followed the Jeff D. decision, one
might be forced to conclude that the Jeff D. majority’s contention that fee
waiver promotes effective vindication of civil rights proved correct after all.
However, the consent decree numbers provided by the Integrated Database
prior to 1979 are implausibly low and thus suspect; those data points have
been labelled as suspect.

Overall Privately Brought Civil Rights Actions

Chart 1: Privately Brought Civil Rights Cases Filed in Federal
Court, 1970—2017
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Chart 2: Privately Brought Class Actions Filed in Federal Court,
1970—2017
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Chart 3: Privately Brought Civil Rights Cases Terminating in
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B. Analysis
Looking only at overall privately-brought civil rights filings, one does not
find the apocalyptic decline some of Jeff D.’s critics predicted. Overall new
annual private civil rights filings did decline after Jeff D.; however, that
decline had begun after 1984, when new private civil rights filings reached
their pre-Jeff D. peak of 20,889.74 Filings declined 3.0% in 1987 relative to
1986 and 2.2% in 1988 relative to 1987. When compared to the 9.5%
decline in filings from 1984 to 1985, the supposed impact of Jeff D. seems
relatively small. While it is certainly possible that the threat of fee waiver
offers had something to do with the post-1984 decline of civil rights filings—
after all, the fee waiver offer was not invented in 1986, but rather had played
a prominent role in civil rights litigation for some time75—it is difficult to
reconcile the reality of Jeff D. with the vision proffered by Justice Brennan
and Professor Reingold. Overall civil rights filings rallied significantly in the
1990s, likely due to the passage of new civil rights bills, including the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
However, overall civil rights filings do not tell the full story of Jeff D. The
case immediately preceded a collapse in new private civil rights class action
filings, a collapse from which the civil rights class action bar has yet to fully
recover.76 While, prior to Jeff D. the number of civil rights class actions filed
annually in federal court had been trending steadily downward from its peak
of 2022 new cases in 1976, with an average 9.2% annual decline from 1977
to 1986, the drop in new private filings after Jeff D. was nothing short of
precipitous. 1987, the first fiscal year after the decision, saw 458 fewer new
private civil rights class action filings than 1986, a 90.3% decline.77 Not until
2003 did the civil rights class action filing rate reach pre-Jeff D. levels—and
it did not stay there! Despite the passage of new civil rights legislation in the
1990s, including the Americans with Disabilities Act, since Jeff D. the annual
filing rate for civil rights class actions has only equaled or exceeded the 1986
filing rate in only four out of thirty years.78
The civil rights class action litigation rate did not rise at all with the
overall civil rights filing rate.
The critics of Jeff D. are further vindicated by the post-Jeff D. decline in
civil rights consent decrees.79 The number of civil rights consent decrees
entered into was at its highest in 1984 and 1986 (670 and 669 consent
74
75
76
77
78
79

See supra Table I and Chart 1.
Fitzhugh, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See supra Table I and Chart 2.
See supra Table I and Chart 2.
See supra Table I and Chart 2.
See supra Table I and Chart 3.

May 2019]

CLASSLESS AND UNCIVIL

1365

decrees, respectively). That number declined by 25% in 1987 relative to
1986, and by 33% in 1990 relative to 1989. It never recovered to its pre-Jeff
D. levels; in fact, as of 2017, it has declined 75% relative to its pre-Jeff D.
figure—this, again, despite the proliferation of new civil rights statutes in the
1990s. This Comment does not claim that the decline was caused by Jeff D.;
however, the decline nonetheless suggests that the supporters of fee waiver
were mistaken in their arguments that Jeff D. would increase settlement.
Ultimately, the data suggests that Jeff D. did have a negative effect on the
willingness of attorneys to bring civil rights actions, but that that negative
effect was smaller than its critics anticipated. This Comment cannot
authoritatively answer why the decline in civil rights filings was localized to
class actions. However, it can offer a few broad speculations in that direction.
Attorneys may have found class actions a more dangerous prospect than
other civil rights cases, due to worries about increased costs of litigation that
they might not recoup. Civil rights attorneys may have been confident that
carefully written retainer agreements would be adequate to protect their fees
in a non-class context. But those same attorneys might have feared that
judges would either treat those retainer agreements as unenforceable in class
actions, or use their Rule 23(e) power over settlement to encourage feewaiver. Finally, there might be other factors impacting civil rights class
action litigation that go beyond the scope of this Comment. Class action
filings grew from 1982 to 1985, but in 1985 they were still only about a third
of their peak in 1976. While the immediate aftermath of Jeff D. saw a more
dramatic percentage decline in filing than any other previous years, Jeff D.
might be interpreted not as a uniquely cataclysmic event, but rather as a
point in a longer process of civil rights class action decline.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHICAL DIFFICULTIES OF JEFF D.
Beyond the systemic effects that the threat of fee waiver offers has on
filings in civil rights litigation, fee waiver offers engender unfairness and
negatively affect the attorney-client relationship. Additionally, civil rights
defense attorneys may face potential ethical issues in making a settlement offer
conditioned on fee-waiver.
A. Individual Unfairness
Fee waiver offers are unfair to lawyers who receive them. It is
axiomatically true that civil rights policy-making should prioritize fairness for
the victims of civil rights violations over fairness for their lawyers. Indeed, it
should even prioritize fairness for civil rights defendants over fairness for
plaintiff’s lawyers (after all, defendants, as parties to litigation, have due
process rights that attorneys lack). The goals of this area of policy-making
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should be to efficiently remedy past and present injustice, and to
disincentivize the future practice of injustice. However, the prioritization of
fairness for actual parties to litigation need not cause the wholesale
discounting of the value of fairness to lawyers themselves. The fact that a
rule causes obvious unfairness to lawyers engaged in litigation, especially
when that rule does not clearly advance a legitimate countervailing interest
for parties to litigation, is by itself a sufficient reason to at least re-consider
the propriety of that rule.
If one accepts the principles that a lawyer deserves reasonable
compensation for her efforts in pursuit of a meritorious claim (especially
when the vindication of that claim substantially promotes broader social
goods), and that the prevailing party fee-shift is reasonable and proper in civil
rights cases, one cannot deny that the rule of Jeff D. lends itself to significant
unfairness. The fact that a civil rights defendant makes a fee waiver offer in
is itself a strong indicator that the civil rights attorney has done an effective
job in building a case for her client. This was the case in Jeff D. itself, as
attorney Johnson had spent several years of his life investigating and
advocating on the behalf of institutionalized children in Idaho.80 While the
district court might not have been inclined to grant all the injunctive relief
Johnson sought,81 Johnson’s case was strong enough that the defendants felt
it was in their best interest to voluntarily incur the likely significant costs of
paying for proper treatment for the institutionalized plaintiff class rather than
risk going to trial. Johnson, and attorneys like him, are left utterly in the
lurch. They have done a commendable service to the public by ensuring the
effective enforcement of civil rights laws, but are left with nothing to show for
it other than the warm feelings of their clients. This is particularly pernicious
for attorneys who eschew more remunerative fields of law in order to work
in public interest. Such attorneys have already made sacrifices to serve the
public. It is insulting to their dignity and injurious to their ability to perform
that service to consider their labor as being worth so little.
Of course, one can conceive of instances where a fee waiver agreement
might be more reasonable. Cases that arrive in the attorney’s office in
already relatively strong shape might be quickly and fairly resolved if an
attorney is willing to forego her fee. Indeed, this was the case for part of the
controversy in Jeff D.—Johnson voluntarily waived his fee to quickly resolve
the elements of the case related to education.82 However, such cases should
not be enough to dismiss the unfairness of the Jeff D. rule. In the absence of
the case’s rule, reasonable attorneys could be expected (but not required) to
80
81
82

Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 722 (1986).
Id. (noting that the substantive terms of defendant’s settlement offer were significantly better than
what the district court had signaled it was likely to order at trial).
Id.
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follow Johnson’s example and waive their fee. Further, even if they are
unwilling to do so, the statutory award of reasonable attorney’s fees suggests
that the fees they would be entitled to would be relatively small. Defendants
would still be incentivized to settle such cases early in litigation, because the
more quickly they resolved the case, the less they would pay in fees.
Another difficulty appears in cases that are not strong but for which the
injunctive relief or substantive damages sought are relatively inexpensive to
defendant. In such cases, defendants might be inclined to enter into a
settlement only if the attorney agrees to a fee waiver. If the attorney were able
to refuse this offer, the client might lose their only opportunity for relief. This
case does seem like it could create some potential unfairness to the client—
losing what really might be their only opportunity for relief. This is a genuine
difficulty but is not strong enough to overcome the sense that the Jeff D. rule
creates more unfairness for attorneys than it does fairness for clients.
B. Perversion of the Attorney-Client Relationship
A further philosophical difficulty ought to be addressed. The relationship
that the threat of the fee waiver offer creates between public interest attorneys
and their clients is antithetical to the ethos of public interest practice. Public
interest attorneys, if they want to protect their attorneys’ fees, can request or
require that their clients sign retainers that waive their right to accept a fee
waiver offer—that is, the client can assign the attorney’s fees to the
attorney.83 The public interest attorney makes this request or demand
knowing that their client, by agreeing, foregoes an important property
interest. The assignment of this interest, in at least some cases, might make
favorable settlement on the merits more difficult. This raises serious
questions about informed consent.
To explain why there might be a lack of informed consent for such
retainer agreements, I offer my experiences working in the summer of 2017
in the landlord-tenant housing unit of a non-profit legal services
organization. While my experiences are admittedly anecdotal, I believe they
can offer insight into the daily effects of Jeff D. on the practice of public
interest law. One of my duties as a legal intern at the legal services
organization was to interview prospective clients. If I determined that these
prospective clients fell within certain categories of need, I would have them
sign a form retainer, and, additionally, an attorney’s fees addendum to the
retainer, in which they assigned any attorney’s fees to which they might be
entitled to the organization. They additionally agreed not to accept an offer
of settlement that included a fee waiver. The prospective clients I saw were,
83

See, e.g., Zeisler v. Neese, 24 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that retainers that assign
attorney’s fees to attorneys are enforceable in civil rights actions).

1368

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:5

by and large, very unlikely to be in a position where they would be entitled
to collect statutory attorney’s fees—the vast majority were defendants in
eviction actions in Philadelphia Municipal Court. However, while I never
interviewed a client in such a case, the likelihood of encountering a
potentially meritorious civil rights case in a landlord-tenant context is
obviously high—racial discrimination in housing, while perhaps more subtle
than it was decades ago, is still common.84
While at the organization, I made no systematic effort to track my clients’
reaction to their retainer forms. At the time, I was myself totally ignorant of
Jeff D. and the threat of fee waiver offers. But based on my best collections,
I believe throughout my summer, I interviewed in the vicinity of eighty to
one hundred potential clients, and accepted approximately forty to fifty for
further assistance.85 Of those forty to fifty, I do not recall a single one who
objected to the terms of the retainer agreement. I think this is in large part
because clients were not inclined to pay the terms very much attention.
While I would give a general overview of the terms, and would offer to read
through the retainer with client if so desired, I cannot recall a single instance
where a client asked substantial questions regarding the retainer agreement.
While a few would take the time to read it over, most would sign it after
giving it only a few moments’ attention, if any. Clients were generally
interested in how to resolve their legal issue, and on how to get an attorney
to represent them at their hearings. They rarely—and understandably!—
expressed interest in the substance of the documents they were signing.
Whether this was because the client trusted me and the organization to
provide them with fair terms of representation, or because the client, fearing
they would lose their one opportunity to find counsel, felt unable to bargain
over the terms of representation, may have varied from case to case.86 But
84

85

86

See, e.g., Suzanne Gamboa, Study: Race Affects Home Buying, Renting, NBC 10 (June 12, 2013),
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Study-Race-Affects-Home-Buying-Renting211136721.html (reporting on racial discrimination in the Philadelphia rental market); see also
Caitlin McCabe, For Minorities, There’s Still Inequality in the Housing Market, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov.
17,
2017),
http://www.philly.com/philly/business/real_estate/residential/minorityhomeownership-black-homeowner-discriminatory-lending-zillow-barrier-renting-20171117.html
(describing racial bias in the home-buyer’s market); N.Y. Times Editorial Board, The Race-Based
Mortgage
Penalty,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/opinion/mortage-minority-income.html
(describing
difficulties black home-buyers face in attaining a mortgage).
In most cases, this meant lobbying an attorney in the unit to agree to represent my client in an
eviction; in other, non-eviction cases, I would only provide advice. Despite the stupendously high
volume of new clients coming in daily, the incredible attorneys in my unit would almost invariably
agree to represent my clients if it was at all within their power to do so.
Of course, while I was happy to answer any questions a client might pose about a retainer, it was
not in my interest, or the organization’s interest, to overly encourage a long dialogue about the
document. Intake at legal services organizations, especially legal services organizations in large
cities, can occur at a breakneck speed. This was especially true in the landlord-tenant unit, which
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one thing is clear to me in retrospect: the rule of Jeff D. was (unbeknownst to
me, and likely unbeknownst to most, if not all, of the other law students and
paralegals at the organization who did intake interviews) undermining the
fairness of my relationship with clients.
Beyond these philosophical difficulties lies a more practical question: to
what degree are these retainer agreements enforceable? These retainer
agreements purport to cede a traditionally client-centered aspect of litigation
to an attorney’s control. Through the retainer, the attorney acquires the
ability to prevent her client from entering into a settlement that contains a
fee waiver, or at least to collect contractual damages against a settling client
for breach of conduct. This acquisition seems to run counter to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which state that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”87 Courts tend to look with
disfavor on attempts by counsel to settle or discontinue litigation contrary to
client wishes,88 and some courts and state ethics committees have explicitly
held that contractual provisions giving lawyers a right to control settlement
are unethical or enforceable.89 However, it has been suggested that, even in
states where attorney control of settlement is explicitly forbidden, an attorney
may generally enter into retainer agreements whereby she acquires a right to
pursue an action against her client if the client agrees to enter into a fee
waiver settlement.90 However, this situation still poses practical and
philosophical problems for both public interest attorneys and attorneys in
private practice. Practically speaking, collecting fees from civil rights
plaintiffs may be difficult, as they may be judgment-proof. Philosophically
speaking, for a public interest attorney to pursue an action for recovery of

87
88

89

90

was the highest-volume department in the organization. On days when I was doing intake, I would
often interview six or seven clients before lunch. Unnecessarily extending these interviews was not
something I particularly desired to do.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N. 2002).
See, e.g., Estate of Falco v. Decker, 233 Cal. Rptr. 807, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (“A client’s right to
reject a settlement is absolute.”); In re Estate of Netzorg, 15 P.3d 926, 930 (Mont. 2000) (“It is . . .
axiomatic . . . that a client has an absolute right to settle his or her case without the consent of
counsel.”); Michael D. Tully Company, L.P.A. v. Dollney, 537 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (holding that an attorney operating on a contingency fee basis could not compel a client to
accept a reasonable settlement, even if non-acceptance would make it extremely unlikely that the
lawyer would be compensated).
Lemmer v. Charney, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 502, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“[A] clause in a retainer
agreement between an attorney and his client prohibiting the client from settling his lawsuit without
the consent of his attorney is void as against public policy.”); Jones v. Feiger, 903 P.2d 27, 34 (Colo.
App. 1994) (“Any provision in an agreement to provide legal services that would deprive a client of
the right to control settlement is unenforceable as against public policy”); CAL. COMM. ON PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY & CONDUCT, Formal Op. 136 (1994) (holding that, in a Section 1988 action, an
attorney could not ethically require a client to sign a retainer agreement giving the attorney control
over settlement).
See cases cited supra note 89.
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fees against a client once again puts her in a position adverse both to the
client’s interests and to the ethos of public interest practice.
I do not mean to suggest that the organization for which I worked
necessarily acts unethically in having clients sign those retainers. Having
clients sign such retainers provides a real benefit to the organization and its
pursuit of justice, by blanketly immunizing itself from fee waivers. This may
be a legitimate solution to the ethical quandary caused by fee waiver offers.
The point is rather that fee waiver creates a genuine ethical quandary. The
point of a legal services organization is to make accessible a legal system that
often presents itself as a hostile, Kafkaesque obstacle course to marginalized
people. When an intake worker—even, in the best-case scenario, one
equipped with better knowledge of Supreme Court case law than I had, and
able to effectively communicate that knowledge—asks a client to sign over
an important property interest, the legal services organization is undermining
its own purpose. It is making a demand (even when the waiver is phrased as
a request, practically speaking, for reasons discussed above, it is probably
heard as a demand) of a marginalized person, a demand they practically
cannot refuse. The legal services organization, even if it acts in the wider
interests of utilitarian justice, is in this small way, making itself part of the
great hostile byzantine legal complex the marginalized person has been
confronting their whole life. Jeff D. forces the legal services organization into
this philosophically uncomfortable position.
C. The Ethics of Making Fee Waiver Offers
Finally, a defense attorney may face ethical difficulties in making a fee
waiver offer. Before the Jeff D. decision, the ethics committees of several state
and local bar associations weighed in on the matter of fee waiver. Their
conclusions varied: some committees found that simultaneous negotiations
of substantive relief and fees was itself unethical; some found that lump sum
offers were ethical, but that demands for a complete waiver of attorney’s fees
was not; and others found there to be no ethical issue with the fee waiver.91
The reasoning behind the restrictive ethical rules rested in the defense
attorney’s supposed duty to ensure the effective enforcement of our civil
rights laws.92 By taking steps that would systemically undermine the ability
of civil rights plaintiffs to bring actions in the future, the defense attorney, the
91

92

See Robert Hewitt Pate, Evans v. Jeff D. and the Proper Scope of State Ethics Decisions, 73 VA. L. REV.
783, 795–96 (1987) (noting that the bar association of the City of New York had taken the strictest
anti-fee waiver stance, that the bar associations of the District of Columbia and Georgia had taken
the middle ground, and that the bar associations of Connecticut, Virginia, and New Mexico had
taken the least restrictive stance).
Id.
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reasoning goes, is not merely playing hard ball at the negotiating table, but
is maliciously attacking access to justice.93
Views differ on the legality of state ethics committees regulating fee
waiver.94 Regardless of the legality of such bans, the reasoning behind ethics
bans on fee waivers seems to overstep the authority of bar association ethics
committees. Fee waiver ethics rules effectively regulate not just the conduct
of the attorney, but the conduct of the defendant. Under these rules, the
defendant, who has the right to seek a settlement with fee waiver, finds itself
governed by an ethics committee that has no rightful jurisdiction over it.
Further, the interest being regulated here is not the defense attorney’s, but
rather her client’s. The moneys that would go to the plaintiff’s attorney
belong to the defendant, not the defendant’s attorney. The defense attorney
does not really garner any direct benefit from making the fee waiver offer. If
anything, the systematic effect of fee waiver is contrary to the defense
attorney’s pecuniary interest, because, while she may be hesitant to admit it,
her livelihood is dependent on the willingness of entrepreneurial plaintiff’s
attorneys to bring future actions. In holding fee waiver offers to be unethical,
state bar associations attempt to act as a surrogate legislature, regulating nonattorney conduct. While the rule of Jeff D. may create unsavory ethical
scenarios for plaintiff’s lawyers, to impose an ethical constraint on the defense
attorney is really to impose an ethical constraint on the defendant.
CONCLUSION
More than thirty years after the decision, Jeff D. and its aftermath may
seem to be of merely historical interest. The threat of fee waiver has become
simply part of the background of the civil rights enforcement landscape.
Perhaps we might be curious about how we arrived at this state of affairs, but
this state of affairs is no longer political. We might talk about how civil rights
attorneys approach the rule of Jeff D.—their use of creative retainers, their
attempts to educate their clients—we might even bemoan the rule as deeply
unjust, but we no longer talk about what is to be done about the rule. The
issue is not a live one.
A deep flaw runs through this way of thinking. The unjustness of a rule
is not undone because it has been in place for three decades. An unjust rule
can be circumvented, it can be undermined, it can even be criticized—but,
most crucially, it can be undone.
93
94

Id.
See Hewitt Pate, supra note 91, at 795–96 (1987) (arguing that state ethical regulation of fee waiver
violates the supremacy clause); Woodlin, supra note 54, at 1215 (arguing that state and local ethics
committees can and should bar defense attorneys from making fee waiver offers).
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The civil rights problems of our day have been eloquently articulated.95
While their solutions do not lie solely in the courtroom, effective private
enforcement of our civil rights laws remains a necessity in addressing them.
Undoing Jeff D. would improve the access of victims of civil rights violations
to effective advocates and hence effective remedies. It could revitalize the
civil rights class action bar by increasing the viability of low-damage and nodamage claims. It would abolish the unfairness inherent to denying a fee to
an attorney who has spent time, energy, and money building a strong case
on behalf of her client. Finally, it would dispense with the awkward
philosophical unseemliness of a legal services organization requesting or
demanding that a prospective client assign to it an important property
interest. Congress ought to act and implement the language it first
considered in the failed Civil Rights Act of 1990.

95

See, e.g., TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015) (presenting a poignant
account of a black man’s encounters with systemic racism, including police brutality and murder);
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW (2017) (highlighting the role consciously racist public
policy played in creating still extant segregation in housing); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The First White
President,
ATLANTIC
MONTHLY
(Oct.
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/the-first-white-president-ta-nehisicoates/537909/ (“To Trump, whiteness is neither notional nor symbolic but is the very core of his
power. In this, Trump is not singular. But whereas his forebears carried whiteness like an ancestral
talisman, Trump cracked the glowing amulet open, releasing its eldritch energies”); Vann R.
Newkirk II, What’s Missing from Reports on Alabama’s Black Turnout, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/can-doug-jones-get-enough-blackvoters-to-win/547574/ (describing voter suppression efforts against black voters in Alabama);
Richard Perez-Peña, White Supremacists Were Ready for Violence in Charlottesville. The Police Were Not,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/charlottesville-whitesupremacist-rally.html (describing private white supremacist violence at the “Unite the Right” rally
in Charlottesville, Virginia).
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APPENDIX
TABLE I: FILINGS AND TERMINATIONS, 1970–2017
Fiscal Overall
Year Privately
Brought
Civil
Rights
Actions
Filed in
Federal
Court

Percent
change
from
previous
year

Privately
Brought
Class
Actions
Filed in
Federal
Court

Percent
change
from
previous
year

Consent
Decrees
Terminated
in Federal
Court

Percent
change
from
previous
year

1970

3,586

n/a

86

n/a

46

n/a

1971

4,609

+ 28.5%

210

+ 144.2%

10

n/a

1972

5,482

+ 18.9%

457

+ 117.6%

0

n/a

1973

6,691

+ 22.1%

1,085

+ 137.4%

0

n/a

1974

7,294

+ 7.7%

1,321

+ 21.7%

0

n/a

1975

9,037

+ 25.4%

1,626

+ 23.1%

0

n/a

1976

10,585

+ 17.1%

2,022

+ 24.4%

0

n/a

1977

11,329

+ 7.0%

1,878

- 8.9%

2

n/a

1978

11,301

- 0.2%

1,522

- 19.0%

2

n/a

1979

11,656

+ 3.1%

1,158

- 23.9%

559

n/a

1980

11,485

- 14.7%

806

- 30.4%

581

+ 3.9%

1981

13,534

+ 17.8%

776

- 3.7%

650

+ 11.9%

1982

16,144

+ 19.3%

544

- 29.9%

648

- 0.3%

1983

17,798

+ 10.2%

436

- 19.5%

629

- 2.9%

1984

19,299

+ 8.4%

555

+ 27.3%

670

+ 6.5%

1985

17,472

- 9.5%

670

+ 20.7%

608

- 9.2%

1986

17,872

+ 2.3%

507

- 24.3%

669

+ 10.0%

1987

17,342

- 3.0%

49

- 90.3%

500

- 25.3%
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1988

16,966

- 2.2%

244

+ 398.0%

548

+ 9.6%

1989

16,950

- 0.1%

125

- 48.8%

413

- 24.6%

1990

16,310

- 3.8%

113

- 9.6%

280

- 32.2%

1991

16,992

+ 4.2%

82

- 27.4%

286

+ 2.1%

1992

21,821

+ 28.4

226

+ 175.6%

319

+ 11.5%

1993

23,109

+ 5.9

92

- 59.3%

284

- 11.0%

1994

27,335

+ 18.3%

161

+ 75.0%

224

- 21.1%

1995

31,627

+ 15.7%

152

- 5.6%

240

+ 7.1%

1996

35,726

+ 13.0%

143

- 5.9%

206

-14.2%

1997

40,026

+ 12.0%

156

+ 9.1%

203

- 1.5%

1998

40,205

+ 0.4%

168

+ 7.7%

206

+ 1.5%

1999

37,646

- 6.4%

163

- 3.0%

217

+ 5.3%

2000

38,446

+ 2.7%

199

+ 22.1%

218

+ 0.5%

2001

37,067

- 3.6%

273

+ 37.2%

199

- 8.7%

2002

37,541

+ 1.3%

327

+ 19.8%

197

+ 1.0%

2003

37,814

+ 0.7%

512

+ 57.1%

211

+ 7.1%

2004

38,845

+ 2.7%

435

- 15.0%

222

+ 5.2%

2005

35,364

- 9.0%

512

+ 17.7%

235

+ 5.9%

2006

33,296

- 5.8%

383

+ 25.2

194

- 17.4%

2007

29,814

- 10.5%

329

- 14.1%

190

- 2.1%

2008

29,124

- 2.3%

230

- 30.1%

195

+ 2.6%

2009

30,699

+ 5.4%

153

- 33.5%

182

- 6.7%

2010

32,125

+ 4.6%

230

+ 50.3%

144

- 20.9%

2011

34,671

+ 7.9%

275

+ 19.6%

144

0%

2012

35,572

+ 2.6%

286

+ 4.0%

189

+ 31.3%

2013

35,048

- 1.5%

432

+ 51.0%

186

- 1.6%

2014

33,153

- 5.4%

441

+ 2.1%

145

- 22.0%
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2015

35,312

+ 6.5%

435

- 1.4%

178

+ 18.5%

2016

35,658

+ 1.0%

513

+ 17.9%

177

+ 0.6%

2017

36,407

+ 2.1%

518

+ 1.0%

167

- 5.6%

